Wiki source code of Wipe Boot Template erstellen

Last modified by Sabrina V. on 2026/07/28 08:23
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1 {{aagon.floatingbox/}}
2
3 = Create a new wipe boot template =
4
5 A wipe boot template is used to boot devices into a special boot environment and automatically delete existing data from the storage media. In this context, the term “wipe” refers to the full removal of files and existing operating systems from a hard drive or SSD.
6 A Wipe Boot Template is used, for example, to securely reset devices before reuse, return, or disposal and to reliably remove old data. Automated execution ensures that the deletion process can be executed consistently on all devices without requiring manual steps.
7
8 {{aagon.versionierungsbox}}
9 Starting with ACMP version 6.10, you can choose wipe methods to determine how data should be deleted and create an interactive wipe boot template.
10 {{/aagon.versionierungsbox}}
11
12 To delete entire hard drives using a Wipe Boot Template, follow these steps:
13
14 ~1. In ACMP, navigate to //OS Deployment > Boot Templates//.
15
16 2. Choose the folder where the boot template should be created.
17
18 3. Click the //Add// button on the ribbon bar and select the //Add Wipe Boot Template// option from the drop-down menu.
19
20 [[Add the Wipe Boot Template>>image:1779430057746-678.png]]
21
22 4.A wizard will open where you can specify the output directory, the name of the new boot template, a description (if applicable), and the Boot Image itself, which will be used as the environment for the wipe process.
23 You can also choose whether the wipe should be performed as an interactive boot template.
24
25 {{aagon.infobox}}
26 An interactive boot template is used to boot Clients into a boot environment via a physical boot medium, rather than booting over the network (PXE). The boot medium contains a Boot Image, which is provided, for example, on a USB drive or as an ISO file. Unlike an automated or wipe boot template, the actions after startup are not executed in a full manner. Instead, administrators can interactively select and confirm which steps should be executed during the boot process, such as starting deployments.
27 {{/aagon.infobox}}
28
29 [[Select the Boot Image>>image:Wipe Boot Template_610.png]]
30
31 5. Click //Next//.
32
33 6. On the next page, configure the template.
34
35 [[Specify the wipe methods>>image:Wipe Boot Template anlegen_Seite2.png]]
36
37 Use the checkboxes to select whether you want to delete all drives or individual drives.
38
39 Then choose which wipe method you want to execute for the delete.
40
41 The wipe method you select determines the procedure used to delete the data on the respective storage device. Since SSDs behave differently from traditional hard drives (HDDs) from a technical standpoint, different deletion methods are available.
42
43 * **SSD**
44
45 Uses a deletion method specifically designed for SSDs. This typically involves a hardware-supported command such as Secure Erase to remove the data quickly and reliably without placing unnecessary strain on the SSD.
46
47 * **SSD Alternative**
48
49 Used when the standard erasure method for SSDs is not supported or fails. In this case, an alternative method is used to securely delete the data. This method is considered less resource-efficient, as it places a heavier load on the SSD and causes more write operations. It should therefore only be used if the standard SSD erasure method is not available.
50
51 * **//No SSD//**
52
53 This method is intended for traditional magnetic hard drives (HDDs). It involves selectively overwriting specific data areas of the disk to prevent data recovery.
54
55 The selected method is automatically applied in ACMP depending on the detected storage device type. This ensures that both SSDs and HDDs are deleted using an appropriate and secure method.
56
57 As a final option, you can decommission the client once the disk deletion has been successfully completed. If applicable, specify the reason for decommissioning.
58
59 {{aagon.infobox}}
60 A decommissioned Client is stored as a “Retired Client” in ACMP.
61 {{/aagon.infobox}}
62
63 {{aagon.infobox}}
64 The Client can only be shut down if all deletions have been completed successfully.
65 {{/aagon.infobox}}
66
67 7. Click //Done//.
68
69 The Wipe Boot Template you created to delete disks is now available in the workspace.
70
71 {{aagon.infobox}}
72 If you have already created old wipe boot templates, you can continue to use them.
73 {{/aagon.infobox}}
74
75 = Monitoring the Wipe Process =
76
77 During a wipe process, only data volumes that are available and accessible on the system can be deleted. If, for example, a drive cannot be processed due to missing hardware, connection issues, or other errors, this is logged accordingly in the [[monitor log>>doc:ACMP.610.Arbeiten mit der ACMP Console.Aufbau der Console.Ribbonleiste.Monitore.WebHome]].
78
79 Both finished and failed deletion operations can be tracked there.
80
81 **Example:**
82
83 Drives 0 and 2 are to be deleted. The deletion of Drive 0 is performed successfully and logged as successful in the monitor log. However, Drive 2 is not present, which is why the deletion process for this drive fails and is displayed as an error. The finished deletion of Drive 0 remains unaffected.
84
85 = Client Detail Plugin "Wipe Logs" =
86
87 You also have the option to view a client’s wipe logs via the Client Details. There, all executed jobs are listed with start and end times, the status (//Running/Successful/Failed//), and additional info for each executed wipe.
88
89 Under “Details,” the logs for each hard drive that was wiped are listed. So, for example, if you wiped 2 drives, you will see 2 logs here.
90
91 You can also output the completed wipes as a report via a Display Field. To do this, go to Display Fields under //Available Fields > Client > OS Deployment > Wipe Reports//.
92
93 = Wipe Methods =
94
95 Wipe methods are used to remove data from a storage medium in a targeted and as secure a manner as possible. Unlike standard deletion or formatting, the goal is not merely to make the data invisible, but to render it permanently inaccessible. This is particularly important when selling or disposing of devices, protecting sensitive information, or before reinstalling a system.
96
97 Different wipe methods are used depending on the storage medium. Some methods overwrite data multiple times, while others utilize special functions of modern SSDs. The goal is to prevent data recovery—even with specialized software—as much as possible.
98
99 The choice of wipe method determines how data is deleted from the respective storage medium. Since SSDs behave technically differently than traditional hard drives (HDDs), ACMP offers different erasure methods:
100
101 **SSD**
102
103 Uses an erasure method specifically designed for SSDs. This typically involves a hardware-supported command such as Secure Erase to remove the data quickly and reliably without placing unnecessary strain on the SSD.
104
105 **SSD Alternative**
106
107 This method is used when the standard SSD erasure method is not supported or fails. In this case, an alternative method is used to securely delete the data nonetheless.
108
109 Since this requires additional write operations, this method is less resource-efficient and can place a heavier load on the SSD. It should therefore only be used if the regular SSD erasure method is not available.
110
111 **HDD**
112
113 This method is intended for traditional magnetic hard drives (HDDs). It involves selectively overwriting specific data areas of the hard drive to prevent data recovery.
114
115 ACMP automatically selects the appropriate wipe method based on the detected storage device type. This ensures that both SSDs and HDDs are deleted using a suitable and secure method.
116
117 The following table provides an overview of the standards supported by ACMP for the delete process:
118
119 {{aagon.infobox}}
120 All items under the SSD option with more than 7 passes have already been filtered out. However, the items under HDD may include options with more than 7 wipe passes.
121 {{/aagon.infobox}}
122
123
124 (% style="width:1694.23px" %)
125 |=Enum|=Name|=(% style="width: 119px;" %)Runs|=(% style="width: 616px;" %)Description|=(% style="width: 209px;" %)Recommended for HDD|=(% style="width: 212px;" %)Recommended for SDD
126 |AFSSI_5020|US Air Force AFSSI 5020|(% style="width:119px" %)3|(((
127 1. Overwrite with 0x00
128 1. Overwrite with 0xFF
129 1. Overwrite with a random character
130
131 After that, “verification should take place”
132 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)"]]
133 |AR_380_19|US Army AR 380-19|(% style="width:119px" %)3|[[image:https://extranet.aagon.com/s/24ys4x/9012/1ca6q62/_/images/icons/emoticons/check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
134 |CSEC_ITSG_06|Canadian CSEC ITSG-06|(% style="width:119px" %)3|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
135 * CSEC= Communication Security Establishment Canada
136 * 3-Fach-Wipe
137 *1. Überschreiben mit 0x00
138 *1. Überschreiben mit 0xFF
139 *1. Überschreiben mit random Bitmuster
140 * Letzter Durchgang wird verifiziert
141 * sehr ähnlich zu DOD_5220_22_M
142 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
143 |DOD_5200_28_STD|US DoD 5200.28-STD|(% style="width:119px" %)7|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
144 * DoD steht für Department of Defense, dem US-Verteidigungsministerium
145 * 1985
146 * 7-Fach-Wipe
147 *1. Überschreiben mit 0x55
148 *1. Überschreiben mit 0xAA
149 *1. Überschreiben mit 0x55
150 *1. Überschreiben mit 0xAA
151 *1. Überschreiben mit 0x55
152 *1. Überschreiben mit 0xAA
153 *1. Überschreiben mit random Character
154 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
155 |DOD_5220_22_M|US DoD 5220.22-M|(% style="width:119px" %)3|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
156 * DoD steht für Department of Defense, dem US-Verteidigungsministerium
157 * 1995
158 * 3-Fach-Wipe:
159 *1. Überschreiben mit fixem Byte, z.B. 0x00
160 *1. Überschreiben Komplement zu 1., z.B. 0xFF
161 *1. Überschreiben mit "cryptographically secure pseudo-random sequence"
162 * Verifikation von allen Durchgängen
163 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
164 |DOD_5220_22_M_E|US DoD 5220.22-M (E)|(% style="width:119px" %)3|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
165 * DoD steht für Department of Defense, dem US-Verteidigungsministerium
166 * 3-Fach-Wipe
167 *1. Überschreiben mit 0xF1
168 *1. Überschreiben mit Komplement von 1 (0x0E)
169 *1. Überschreiben mit random Character
170 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
171 |DOD_5220_22_M_ECE|US DoD 5220.22-M (ECE)|(% style="width:119px" %)7|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
172 * DoD steht für Department of Defense, dem US-Verteidigungsministerium
173 * 2001
174 * 7-Fach-Wipe
175
176 1. bis 3.: DOD_5220_22_M_E
177
178 4. Überschreiben mit random Character
179
180 5. bis 7. DOD_5220_22_M_E
181 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
182 |GOST_R_50739_95_1|Russian GOST R 50739-95 (1 pass)|(% style="width:119px" %)1|(% style="width:616px" %)Überschreiben mit random Byte|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
183 |GOST_R_50739_95_2|Russian GOST R 50739-95 (2 passes)|(% style="width:119px" %)2|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
184 * 2-Fach-Wipe
185 *1. Überschreiben mit 0x00
186 *1. Überschreiben mit random Byte
187 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
188 |HMG_IS5_B|British HMG IS5 (Baseline)|(% style="width:119px" %)2|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
189 *
190 *1. Überschreiben mit 0x00
191 *1. Überschreiben mit pseudo random Bitmuster
192 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
193 |HMG_IS5_E|British HMG IS5 (Enhanced)|(% style="width:119px" %)3|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
194 *
195 *1. Überschreiben mit 0x00
196 *1. Überschreiben mit 0xFF
197 *1. Überschreiben mit "cryptographically secure pseudo-random sequence"
198 * Verifikation aller Durchgänge
199 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
200 |ISM_6_2_92|Australian ISM 6.2.92|(% style="width:119px" %)1|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
201 * australisch
202 * Überschreiben mt random Bitmuster
203 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
204 |NAVSO_P_5239_26_MFM|US Navy NAVSO P-5239-26 (MFM)|(% style="width:119px" %)3|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
205 * 3-Fach-Wipe
206 *1. Überschreiben 0x01
207 *1. Überschreiben mit 0x7FFFFFFF (32-Bit mit führender 0, dann nur noch 1)
208 *1. Überschreiben mit unterschiedlichen random Bitmuster
209 * Verifikation
210 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
211 |NAVSO_P_5239_26_RLL|US Navy NAVSO P-5239-26 (RLL)|(% style="width:119px" %)3|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
212 * 3-Fach-Wipe
213 *1. Überschreiben mit 0x01
214 *1. Überschreiben mit 0x27FFFFFF
215 *1. Überschreiben mit unterschiedlichen random Bitmustern
216 * Verifikation
217 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
218 |NCSC_TG_025|US NCSC-TG-025|(% style="width:119px" %)3|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
219 * 3-Fach-Wipe
220 *1. Überschreiben mit 0x00
221 *1. Überschreiben mit 0xFF
222 *1. Überschreiben mit random Character
223 * Verifikation nach jedem Schritt
224 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
225 |NIST_800_88_1R|NIST 800-88 (1 pass random)|(% style="width:119px" %)1|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
226 * NIST steht für National Institute of Standard
227 * Überschreibt alle adressierbaren Speicherplätze einmal mit zufälligen Bitmustern
228 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
229 |NIST_800_88_1Z|NIST 800-88 (1 pass zeros)|(% style="width:119px" %)1|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
230 * NIST steht für National Institute of Standard
231 * Überschreibt alle adressierbaren Speicherplätze mit Nullen
232 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
233 |NIST_800_88_3|(((
234 NIST 800-88 (3 passes)
235
236
237 )))|(% style="width:119px" %)3|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
238 * NIST steht für National Institute of Standard
239 * 3-Fach-Wipe:
240 *1. Überschreiben mit 0x00
241 *1. Überschreiben mit 0xFF
242 *1. Überschreiben mit pseudo-random String
243 * am Ende verifizieren
244 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
245 |NSA_130_1|US NSA 130-1|(% style="width:119px" %)3|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
246 3-Fach-Wipe
247
248 1.und 2. Überschreiben mit random Wert
249
250 3. Überschreiben mit 0xAA
251 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
252 |NZSIT_402|New Zealand NZSIT 402|(% style="width:119px" %)1|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
253 * Überschreibt jeden Sektor mit einem random Byte
254 * danach wird verifiziert
255 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
256 |PFITZNER_7|Pfitzner 7-pass|(% style="width:119px" %)7|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
257 * Roy-Pfitzner-Methode
258 * 7-Fach-Wipe mit random Byte
259 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
260 |PFITZNER_33|Pfitzner 33-pass|(% style="width:119px" %)33|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
261 * Roy-Pfitzner-Methode
262 * 33-Fach-Wipe mit random Bitmustern
263 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
264 |RCMP_TSSIT_OPS_II|Canadian RCMP TSSIT OPS-II|(% style="width:119px" %)7|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
265 * Royal Canadian Mounted Police: Technical Security Standards for Information Technology
266 * 7-Fach-Wipe, oft wie folgt implementiert
267 *1. Überschreiben mit 0x00
268 *1. Überschreiben mit 0xFF
269 *1. Überschreiben mit 0x00
270 *1. Überschreiben mit 0xFF
271 *1. Überschreiben mit 0x00
272 *1. Überschreiben mit 0xFF
273 *1. Überschreiben mit random Bitmuster
274 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
275 |SCHNEIER|Bruce Schneier|(% style="width:119px" %)7|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
276 * Bruce-Schneider-Methode
277 * 7-Fach-Wipe:
278 *1. Überschreiben mit 0x00
279 *1. Überschreiben mit Komplement von 1 (also 0xFF)
280 *1. - 7. Überschreibe alle adressierbaren Speicherplätze mit pseudo-random Bitmustern
281 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
282 |VSITR|German VSITR|(% style="width:119px" %)7|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
283 * deutscher Standard; (VS=Verschlusssachen; IT=Informationstechnik; R=Richtlinie)
284 * 1998 bis 2009, inzwischen abgelöst
285 * Richtlinien zum Geheimschutz von Verschlusssachen beim Einsatz von Informationstechnik
286 * 7-Fach-Wipe mit festen Mustern: 0x00, 0xFF abwechselnd und am Ende 0xAA (Wikipedia)
287 * "7 sequental passes, consistently filling it with the specific patterns"
288 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]
289 |SSD_SANITIZE|SSD Sanitize|(% style="width:119px" %)n.A.|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
290 * Sanitize, säubern
291 * Nur für NVMe
292 * Factory Reset und löschen der Daten
293 * Nicht von allen SSDs unterstützt
294 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]
295 |Sanitize + Crypto| |(% style="width:119px" %) |(% style="width:616px" %) |(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]
296 |SSD_SE| |(% style="width:119px" %)n.A.|(% style="width:616px" %)(((
297 * Secure Erase, schnelles Löschen
298 * Factory Reset
299 * zurücksetzen aller Flash-Zellen auf Zustand "1": unprogrammiert
300 * kein Löschen/Überschreiben nur die Zuordnungstabelle leeren
301 )))|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]
302 |Secure Erase + Crypto| |(% style="width:119px" %) |(% style="width:616px" %) |(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]
303 |TRIM|SSD Trim|(% style="width:119px" %)n.A.|(% style="width:616px" %)"SSD Trim is a hardware command to safely wipe solid state drives. It’s universal and can be applied to almost all SSD drives SATA/NVMe."|(% style="width:209px" %)[[image:forbidden.svg||alt="(Minus)" height="16" width="16"]]|(% style="width:212px" %)[[image:check.svg||alt="(Haken)"]]
304
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